The early registration period for ACM EC 2014 ends today. Also, I’d like to draw your attention to this year’s EC tutorials (not without self-interest):
Recent progress in multi-dimensional mechanism design
Organizers: Yang Cai (UC Berkeley), Costis Daskalakis (MIT), and Matt Weinberg (MIT)
Abstract: Mechanism design in the presence of Bayesian priors has received much attention in the Economics literature, focusing among other problems on generalizing Myerson’s celebrated auction to multi-item settings. Nevertheless, only special cases have been solved, with a general solution remaining elusive. More recently, there has been an explosion of algorithmic work on the problem, focusing on computation of optimal auctions, and understanding their structure. The goal of this tutorial is to overview this work, with a focus on our own work. The tutorial will be self-contained and aims to develop a usable framework for mechanism design in multi-dimensional settings.
Axiomatic social choice theory: from Arrow’s impossibility to Fishburn’s maximal…
View original post 535 more words